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ABSTRACT 
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Technology plays an increasingly important role in health care. Failures and unpredicted ef-
fects of health technology may lead to disastrous consequences such as injuries and casualties, 
but they also mean huge financial costs, waste of resources, legal issues and loss of public trust 
for medical care systems and health technology industry. Therefore, technology failures should 
be prevented for the sake of patients, functional health care systems and technological advance-
ment. The objective of this thesis is to indicate, that properly conducted technology assess-
ment (TA) is critical for preventing failures. Short theoretical background is presented draw a 
more comprehensive picture of TA, its functions and origins. A literature review has been per-
formed to find those ingredients of technology assessment, which are essential from the perspec-
tive of failure prevention. Such elements are objectivity and impartiality, planning, choosing as-
sessment criteria, foreseeing adverse effects, technology comparison, and periodical reassess-
ments.   
To underline the vitality of properly conducted TA, an example of metal-on-metal hip implants 
failure is introduced. The reasons for failure are analysed and prevention steps, which should 
have been implemented, are proposed. 
This thesis is an approach to TA seen as a practical and essential tool. It is an attempt to 
demonstrate, that TA should be of great interest for biomedical engineering. Since biomedical 
engineers are professionals, who design and manufacture health technology, TA provides a great 
methodology for them to improve the whole innovation process. TA is also important for better 
understanding of technology development paths and their consequences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Technology has become an inseparable part of everyday life. We increasingly depend 
on technology, not only at work and at home, but also health care and medicine rely on 
technology more than ever. This growth of technology use has changed the way busi-
nesses, societies and medicine work. In business world, technological difference be-
tween product offerings has become a key factor in establishing competitive advantage. 
Similarly, research teams often distinguish themselves by implementing novel technolo-
gies. Technologies and their optimal use are critical for obtaining meaningful research 
results and scientifically important discoveries. 
The position of technology and public reliance on it have brought modern society to a 
point, where newer, improved technologies are on high demand. Consequently, new 
technologies are being reported and put into use at probably the highest rate ever. There 
is a rush to innovate in attempt to keep up with the expectations of the market and to 
survive in a competitive environment. [1] Investing in or adoption of an innovation gen-
erate risks, but organizations, which stay behind may lose the race for competitive ad-
vantage or even disappear from the stage [2]. Sometimes this hunger for new technology 
leads to early diffusion of new technologies without adequate measurements of their 
effects [3].  Undoubtedly, technological innovations introduce opportunities to facilitate 
medicine, well-being, research, education and simple everyday life activities; however, 
they also carry along unintended, unknown short- or long-term effects. Those effects 
may be a threat to human safety or life, or they may be harmful for the environment. They 
can be both economically and socially costly. Health technology failures are among the 
most dangerous incidents from the perspective of human safety and life, and they can 
cause serious public traumas and mistrust in health care systems. Unfortunately, failure 
of medical technologies is not rare.[4] For this reason, a society, which is constantly 
seeking new benefits from technology, should have a means to minimize the scale and 
frequency of technology failures, with emphasis on health technology failures, to ensure 
their own safety.  
The objective of this thesis is to introduce technology assessment (TA) as a tool of get-
ting an adequate picture of biomedical technologies, and to illustrate the scientific basis 
of TA through analysis of selected instances of technology failure. A list of TA elements, 
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critical for technology failure prevention, will be proposed. An example of technology 
assessment misconduct, resulting in technology failure, will be presented. The reasons 
of failure will be analyzed in order to demonstrate, how technology assessment could 
have been used to avoid reversal. TA is a vast field and this thesis attempts to distill key 
elements of TA, then illustrate their utility in the context of known technology failures. It 
is not an exhaustive review. The aim is to propose a point of view on developing ade-
quate tools for technology failure prevention.  
The significance of technology assessment and prevention of technology failure for BME 
is inherently apparent. Biomedical engineers actively contribute to the rush of innovation 
by designing and producing medical devices, which are later adopted by health care 
institutions. Thus, biomedical engineers are or should be qualified to assess the perfor-
mance of those devices. In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommends 
engaging biomedical engineers in the process of medical device evaluation by employing 
them in health technology assessment agencies [5]. The need to incorporate BME pro-
fessionals into the teams conducting HTA has been identified also by several authors 
[5],[6],[7],[8]. Concurrently, occasional negligence related to health technology assess-
ment has been observed in the field of biomedical engineering. It is thought that there is 
less training than needed, too scarce debate, and not enough recognition of health tech-
nology assessment as being one of the core tasks of biomedical engineering [5],[8]. This 
thesis is an attempt to drag more attention toward technology assessment as an ex-
tremely important tool for biomedical engineering, which, however, may serve many dif-
ferent functions for different stakeholders and in variety of situations. After all, as Feigal 
et. al wrote in their article regarding safety of medical devices, “[e]nsuring that medical 
devices are safe and effective is everyone’s business” [9]. 
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2. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN BIOMEDICAL 
ENGINEERING 
It is important to agree on the meaning of terms used in the discussion to avoid misun-
derstanding and confusion, and to define the frames of the subject. In addition, the ori-
gins of technology assessment will be introduced to help in understanding the signifi-
cance of this tool. The importance of technology assessment in the context of biomedical 
engineering and technology failure is further discussed in the last sections of this chapter. 
2.1 Technology, biomedical engineering, health technology 
We focus here on the assessment of technological solutions in the context of biomedical 
research and health care. The term “technology” should be the starting point for any 
attempts of formulating technology evaluation criteria. Technology is a broad term, un-
derstood differently by different people, and as such does not have one unique definition. 
It is often defined as the practical application of knowledge [2],[3], however, this definition 
includes virtually anything. E. Braun proposes a more specific definition of technology, 
which is: “the material artefacts used to achieve some practical human purpose and the 
knowledge needed to produce and operate such artefacts”[2] and this is how technology 
is understood in this work. This explanation clearly distinguishes two elements of tech-
nology: (1) physical tools, machines and other means, and (2) immaterial knowledge, 
processes, ways and ideas.  
Constant change is the most characteristic feature of technology.[2] The change can be 
aimed at one of the following goals: better performance (e.g. higher speed, higher effi-
ciency, more automated features, etc.) or executing tasks, which earlier were performed 
by humans. The motivation for changes may be either an actual need expressed by 
customers or identified as existing in the market (market pull) or introducing a revolution-
ary technology, for which market is hoped to be created or increased (technology push). 
The change can also be incremental (gradual improvements of already existing technol-
ogy based on pre-existing skills and knowledge) or radical (revolutionary technology 
based on new solutions and requiring new skills). When it is believed that an improve-
ment has been achieved, the result is an innovation: “a new or essentially improved 
technology, or product of technology, that is offered for commercial transactions on the 
market.”[2] 
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Technology can be applied to specific areas and hence become a narrower concept.[10] 
Examples of such specific areas are biomedical engineering and health technology. Bi-
omedical engineering can be defined as “the use of the principles and techniques of 
engineering to solve problems in biology and medicine” and its development rate is said 
to be among the fastest.[6] This interdisciplinary field of technology, practiced both as 
business and academic discipline, serves as a tool for medical and life research, and 
provides solutions and innovations for health care. Biomedical engineering includes ele-
ments of wide spectrum of other sciences, e.g. biology, nanomedicine, space medicine, 
molecular and cellular engineering, electrical engineering, robotics and tissue engineer-
ing.[1],[6] Medicine and health care increasingly rely on technologies and devices pro-
vided by biomedical engineering. Biomedical technologies can be observed as tools for 
prevention, imaging, diagnosis, treatment, rehabilitation and prostheses. The mutual 
connection is so deep that the boundaries between terms biotechnology and medical 
device have become indistinguishable.[1] It is expected that the relationship between 
medicine and biomedical engineering will remain close also in the future, and that bio-
medical engineering will play the key role in delivering health care to the patients.[1],[6] 
Medvedec defines health technology as “a test, device, medicine, vaccine, procedure, 
program or system developed to prevent, diagnose or treat medical conditions, promote 
health, provide rehabilitation or organize healthcare delivery” and underlines the tight 
connection between it and biomedical engineering.[7] Often health technology is a prod-
uct of biomedical engineering. Examples of health technology are diagnostic and treat-
ment methods, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, rehabilitation and prevention meth-
ods, organizational and supportive systems within which health care is provided [11]. In 
this work the focus is on the physical technological solutions: devices and equipment 
used in medicine and health care. 
2.2 Technology Assessment 
Technological solutions provided by biomedical engineering have significantly contrib-
uted to the development and improvement of health care.[1] Medicine and health care 
increasingly rely on biomedical devices. Patients’ safety, health and life are at stake. 
However, in addition to intended effects, a technology may well have unintended influ-
ence on the consumer or its environment. Technology’s adverse effects or its complete 
failure may lead to severe injuries, permanent damage to health, or even deaths, which 
consequently imply technology recall, legal issues, huge financial costs, public mistrust 
and loss of prestige for health care centers using the failed technology, and for research 
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institutions or private companies who designed and produced those technologies. There-
fore, all possible influences of any technology, particularly a new one, must be explored 
before the technology diffuses and becomes an established method for medical practice. 
Authors assign the moral responsibility resulting from manufacturing or using medical 
devices to both physicians and biomedical engineers.[4] In addition to desired and un-
desired consequences of utilization of a given technology, the purpose of the technology 
and the most efficient ways to use it must be known in order for the technology to be a 
valuable factor of the successful business or health treatment. Efficient, or optimal, use 
of technology is understood here as such use, which enables obtaining the best results 
with the least overall cost in the application the technology was designed for. Recogniz-
ing features and functionality of a given technology helps health care institutions to 
choose the best possible option for treatment in a given case, and facilitates research 
groups and firms in deciding whether investment and development of a particular tech-
nology makes sense [1]. Ensuring the safety and effectiveness of health technology as 
well as informed decision-making related to health technology are not possible without 
technology assessment. 
Technology assessment (TA) can be defined as an interdisciplinary research field, which 
attempts to produce information for educated and well-reflected decision-making.[12] It 
is a tool to investigate technologies thoroughly and with foresight in its full context: what 
opportunities and limitations this technology offers within frames of the organization’s 
interests, resources, skills, structure, and social environment the organization operates 
in.[2] It is a systematic evaluation of properties of a technology and it should address 
aspects such as safety, efficacy, effectiveness, costs and cost-effectiveness of the eval-
uated solution [13]. It is often emphasized in the literature, that a broader context has to 
be considered in technology assessment, namely, all direct and indirect impacts and 
side-effects of technology adoption, social, legal ethical and safety implica-
tions.[3],[2],[13],[14] All these aspects must be considered in evaluation process, as 
change of technology will affect all of them [15]. However, the attention payed to each of 
them will vary between TAs conducted for different technologies, depending on their ap-
plication and context.[13] Context-specificity is among the most characteristic features 
of TA often emphasized in literature.[3],[13],[14],[16] Any evaluation is dedicated and 
conducted for a specific audience and is designed to answer specific questions, and 
those frames dictate the extent of the assessment and methods used to perform it.[14] 
TA is also methodologically sound; it is a process of collecting the best available evi-
dence in a systematic, transparent and reproducible way. Evidence in this context means 
the result of systematic observation or experiment.[14] The product of TA is assessment 
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report, which is a technically detailed document, demonstrating the validity of the evi-
dence and making the evidence accessible and usable also by those, who are not the 
direct auditions of the report.[14]  
2.3 Health technology assessment 
Technology assessment applied to health care management and policy results in health 
technology assessment (HTA)[1]. Initially, terms such as “medical technology assess-
ment” and “healthcare technology assessment” were used, but they have nearly disap-
peared from the literature [10]. Although HTA has emerged from TA, it has been empha-
sized that there are several differences between these two disciplines. First, HTA is very 
complex due to it requiring expertise in multiple scientific fields: technological and engi-
neering knowledge must be compatible with clinical use. There are many stakeholders 
involved, and many external factors influence the process, for instance legal regulations, 
social judgement, medical constraints, and fragmentation of health care industry. Also, 
there is a vast ethical and moral burden related to HTA.[1],[16] Nevertheless, despite 
differences between HTA and TA applied to other disciplines, the methods used in both 
approaches are the same [1]. 
Health technology assessment is defined based on its purpose and not methodology 
[17]. European network for Health Technology Assessment (EUnetHTA) defines HTA as 
“a multidisciplinary process that summarizes information about the medical, social, eco-
nomic, and ethical issues related to the use of health technology in a systematic, trans-
parent, unbiased, robust manner. Its aim is to inform the formulation of safe, effective, 
health policies that are patient focused and seek to achieve best value. Despite its policy 
goals, HTA must always be firmly rooted in research and the scientific method.” [11] HTA 
is usually performed by groups of professionals of multiple specializations, who use dif-
ferent analytical methods [3]. Similarly to TA, HTA is context-embedded.[13] Since HTA 
grew out from technology assessment, it also focuses on providing the best available 
evidence. HTA shares the principles of evidence-based analysis with evidence-based 
medicine and clinical practice guidelines, and together with them constitutes the best 
practice initiative.[14] 
Several authors observe that HTA has been criticized for emphasizing too much on effi-
cacy and cost-effectiveness of health technologies, and not enough on ethical and soci-
opolitical implications [10],[13]. Banta is even concerned that because of this shortcom-
ings, HTA may become dysfunctional [10]. In turn, Integlia and Mazzoni argue, that eth-
ical issues cannot be measured with reliable quantitative methods, and thus can cause 
disagreements, so that excluding them from HTA may be justified.[13] 
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2.4 Brief history of technology assessment 
The need for technology assessment in its modern form arose in 1950s and 1960s in the 
United States.[2],[10] In that time, it started becoming apparent, that besides benefits, 
technology can bring also undesirable effects. Moreover, investing in technological inno-
vations became more expensive and riskier. Thus, demands for technology control and 
support started growing and increasing pressure was put on the United States Con-
gress.[2] As a response to those demands, in 1972 Congress established Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (OTA) [2],[10]. Its scope was to provide Congress with ready, reliable 
and comprehensive information about technologies, so that Congress could make deci-
sions. OTA existed until 1995 and during its tenure it produced around 750 studies on 
variety of topics. It was criticized as being redundant to other governmental activities. On 
the other hand, some referred to its shutdown as “an example of politics overriding sci-
ence”. It stimulated development of technology assessment in the US and internationally, 
however, it did not inspire any greater, international initiatives. Individual technology as-
sessment programs are run by governments, universities, research institutions and in-
dustry in North America and Europe. [10] 
Nevertheless, HTA, which at present seems to be much more institutionalized than TA, 
is said to have its roots in OTA as well [13],[17]. In 1975 OTA started its health program 
and this date is provided by some authors as the beginning of HTA [13]. Others date 
HTA back to 1976, when the Office of Health Technology Assessment was established 
under the USA Health Care Financing Administration [18]. Likewise, HTA emerged in 
Europe in 1970s, when concerns related to economic effects of health technologies 
started arousing. The first institutions, whose task was HTA, were established in France 
and Spain in 1980s, but their influence was limited to local activity.[14] Sweden was the 
first European country to have its national HTA institution, opened in 1987 [13],[14]. 
Since then the institutionalization of HTA in Europe has progressed. In 1985 the first 
meeting of the International Society for Technology Assessment in Health Care 
(ISTAHC, today called HTAi) took place. Moreover, there were three projects funded by 
European Commission, which gave foundations for the modern HTA in Europe, and 
those were EUR-ASSESS project, HTA Europe project and the European Collaboration 
for Health Technology Assessment (ECHTA). The most important outcome of the last 
one, ECHTA, is the formulation of best practice guidelines for performing and reporting 
HTAs. In 1993 The International Network of Agencies for Health Technology Assessment 
(INAHTA) was established. [14]. This network exists also today and it unites 51 HTA 
agencies from 32 countries worldwide [19]. 
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2.5 The importance of technology assessment in the context of 
technology failure 
Technology is subject to constant change – it “is never so perfect that it could not be 
improved, and new knowledge brings with it new technological possibilities”.[2] As a re-
sult, innovations, new or significantly improved technologies, emerge in the market all 
the time. In fact, replacement (a process in which an old technology has become obso-
lete, and it is being replaced with a new, better technology) is one of the two reasons 
why a decision to abandon an old technology is made.[4] The other reason is reversal: 
an established technology is abandoned, because it has been discovered that it has not 
fulfilled its purpose all along, or that it causes harms, which are greater than its benefits. 
While replacement is a natural consequence of technological development, reversal 
should be an extremely rare phenomenon, especially in case of health and medical care 
technology, however, it is reported to be ubiquitous. [4] Reversal reveals that multiple 
mistakes have been made on the path from an idea to a product diffused in the market, 
it usually ends up with technology recall, and its effects are dangerous. Having all these 
features, reversal is synonymous with failure. Although technology failure cannot be 
completely eliminated, it is crucial that failure is diminished to the lowest possible level, 
especially for medical devices. [4],[20]  TA and HTA are instruments in hands of policy-
makers, physicians and biomedical engineers, which can be used to minimize the risks 
of technology failure.  
Technology assessment provides evidence-based, detailed information about a technol-
ogy, not only as absolute values, but also in relation to competitive technologies. The 
information is contextualized and precise, it is gathered and recorded in a systematic 
and methodologically sound manner. Such data is easier to interpret or compare, it can 
be used better by stakeholders and enables wide propagation of information. Therefore, 
by producing high-quality information, TA supports educated decision making on many 
different levels of organizations [1],[13], helps allocate resources efficiently and ade-
quately, and enables organizations to choose the best technology available on the mar-
ket for a given application [21]. Consequently, TA and HTA allow diffusion of relevant 
technologies, and prevent diffusion of marginally useful methods [3],[16], as well as those 
technologies, which are potentially harmful. 
In the context of research centers focused on BME, high-quality, timely technology as-
sessment can most importantly improve the quality of research by assuring with meth-
odologically sound methods the validity of data collected with help of the assessed tech-
nology. In addition, HTA helps identify research gaps [22].  It can also speed up the 
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progression rate of a study, be a tool for better resource management and allocation, 
and thus become a key factor in achieving competitive advantage. HTA also enables 
verification, if stakeholders’ needs have been satisfied by the technology. Eventually, it 
provides evidence for the significance of a research or for the contribution of a product 
to the development of health care [22]. Well-designed and widely used TA and HTA for 
research institutions would establish a habit of conducting technology management 
based on scientific and local evidence [18] and promote the principles of responsible 
research and innovation [23]. All these functions of HTA facilitate technology failure pre-
vention. 
HTA is thus a bridge between biomedical engineering and health care delivery [1]. It is 
fundamental for ensuring safety, efficacy and effectiveness of health technologies [3]. 
There will always be a certain amount of risk related to health technologies [18], but TA 
and HTA can help make a decision, whether in given circumstances the risk is worth 
taking or not [2]. Those two methodologies are also crucial for reducing the frequency of 
device failure and medical reversals. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A collection of the most significant technology assessment elements from the perspec-
tive of preventing technology failure, was formed based on an analysis of the literature 
discussing the topic of technology assessment and health technology assessment. The 
selected works include scientific articles published in peer-reviewed journals related to 
medicine, biomedical technology, engineering and industrial management; reports pub-
lished by health policy monitoring organizations, as well as books and monographs. The 
texts were chosen according to their scientific value, relevance to the topic, availability 
and author’s interest. The objective was to use possibly newest publications. The se-
lected literature was published between years 1989 and 2019. It is noteworthy that not 
all most relevant publications grant free access for readers, and those were excluded 
from the review. 
As emphasized earlier, this work is not an attempt to create a detailed description of the 
whole technology assessment process nor to conduct an exhaustive literature review. 
This thesis presents an approach to technology assessment in the context of technology 
failure, built on the existing material provided by earlier studies, and filtered through au-
thor’s personal judgement as a biomedical engineer at the beginning of their professional 
career. In addition, the process of TA elements selection was influenced by the case of 
biomedical technology failure analysed in chapter 5: Case Study. Cited case is a well-
known incident, widely discussed in literature: metal-on-metal hip implants failure.  
11 
 
4. THE ELEMENTS OF HTA CRITICAL FOR TECH-
NOLOGY FAILURE PREVENTION 
The result of conducted literature review is a short list of the HTA and TA components, 
which are critical for preventing technology failure. The selection of the elements is sub-
jective; however, it has been influenced by the opinions and reasoning demonstrated in 
the study material and the frequency of elements’ reappearance in those texts. The order 
of the elements reflects the logical propagation of a TA process, yet it is also subjective 
and just as the order of TA steps can be changed depending on the research matter, the 
order introduced below could be subject to modifications as well. 
4.1 Element 1: Impartiality and objectivity 
This list opens with principles of HTA and TA, which should be imperative and undisputed 
signpost all along the process, starting from the assembly of an assessment group. 
Those principles are impartiality and objectivity. 
Several authors report concerning phenomena which may be observed in certain type of 
HTAs. Namely, industry sponsored assessments tend to be biased [22],[24]: flawed, fa-
vourable methodology is used, the results are too optimistic, and some data may even 
be withheld from the public to provide a misleading picture of the technology [4]. Conflicts 
of interest within the group conducting an evaluation may also lead to unreliable results 
and is mentioned by many authors as hazards related with TA and HTA [4],[15],[21],[24]. 
Some authors are worried, that temptation of benefit may lead to corruption of scientific 
research [24]. It has been observed that malpractice within medical device approval pro-
cesses and lapses in regulatory mechanisms facilitated by misleading reports from in-
dustry, have occurred [4]. Those practices are obviously dangerous, morally improper 
and through the practice of sound HTA should be prevented as they may lead to cata-
strophic consequences. 
Impartiality and objectivity are the only guarantee of an unbiased, methodologically 
sound assessment, undue optimism and unreported uncertainties. They are crucial for 
reliability of information produced by technology assessments and therefore are placed 
on the top of the list of TA elements essential for technology failure prevention. Although 
impartiality and objectivity are impossible to measure, they should be for TA assessors 
what Hippocratic Oath is for physicians and should always point the direction of assess-
ment. Absolute objectivity is out of human reach, but a reasonable approximation can be 
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achieved by assessors, who put an effort into being as truthful as possible, are not afraid 
to say what they see as the truth, who gather data from all available sources in a meth-
odologically sound process and who identify and admit the shortcomings of their study 
[2]. Forming a team of experts, who do not have conflicts of interests, do not receive 
benefits from the organization of technology’s origin nor from their competitors, and who 
have inquisitive and sceptical attitude, results in closeness to impartiality.  
4.2 Element 2: Planning 
Prior to the proper conduct of assessment, the whole process should be carefully 
planned. First, clear and actionable research questions must be formulated, so that the 
scope of the assessment is known and understood by all assessors [2],[3],[21],[25]. The 
problem cannot be too narrow nor too wide, otherwise the assessment will miss its pri-
mary aim of providing relevant and usable information for decision makers [2]. The tech-
nology of interest should be characterized and its intended functionalities and expecta-
tions related to them ought to be defined [1],[2] and the feasibility of those tasks and 
expectations must be evaluated [16]. Also, the end-point in time should be established, 
so that technology effects over an adequate period of time can be observed [2]. While 
establishing the time horizon, it is essential to consider, if any delayed consequences 
are possible. This stage includes also choosing research methods, scientifically justified 
and relevant to the type of technology being assessed and to its intended application. 
Transparency and reproducibility are indisputable requirements for method selection 
[23]. The logistic issues should be addressed, so that no organizational obstacles would 
interrupt the proper assessment [3]. If the process requires clinical test, the features of 
population engaged in the trials ought to be designed, so that the assessment is clinically 
relevant and scientifically valid [3],[22]. Finally, a feedback loop has to be determined. It 
is important that assessors know how to decide whether the research questions have 
been answered and when further studying would not produce valuable results any-
more.[22] The methods and timing of internal quality control should be defined, and du-
ties related to it ought to be assigned. 
As TA and HTA are context-embedded, it is not possible to create one universal strategy 
or protocol for conducting the evaluation [21]. The assessors can use existing case stud-
ies and (H)TA reports as well as recommendations of national and international agencies 
to deepen their knowledge about methodologies relevant to their study subjects and re-
search questions. Above all, assessors should rely on their experience, expertise and 
creativity to create the most adequate protocol for a given HTA.   
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The planning stage is necessary for ensuring systematic study conduct, following the 
protocol, collecting all relevant data and consistent information record. Furthermore, a 
well-planned research strategy diminishes bias. 
4.3 Element 3: Defining criteria of evaluation 
The protocol of conducting HTA is not complete without the criteria according to which 
the technology is going to be evaluated [1],[3],[26]. Some authors argue that defining 
evaluation criteria could be the most important step of TA. [25] Those criteria should 
respond to the problems which need to be addressed. They should also reflect the 
needs, expectations and preferences of various stakeholders. The criteria can be broken 
down into sub-criteria and those can acquire single or multiple attributes. Criteria should 
be ordered hierarchically according to their importance for the purpose of the assess-
ment. The whole system can be formed into value tree, which is one of the tools utilized 
to estimate the value of technology in a transparent and systematic way. [25],[26] 
Criteria can be borrowed from the earlier studies or existing reports, they might be based 
on interviews with the stakeholders, or designed by the assessors’ team. The list of dis-
tinctive criteria should be limited to only those necessary for adequate depiction of tech-
nology. In any case, ideal criteria are understandable, operational, non-redundant, con-
cise and essential for the research problem. Similarly, the attributes of criteria should be 
understandable and operational, but also unambiguous, comprehensive and direct.  A 
necessary step is defining such range of attributes, which is acceptable for a given pur-
pose. [25] The measurable features can be described using quantitative scales, and for 
immeasurable features a qualitative scale consisting of verbal or graphical values often 
turns out to be more functional [2],[25],[26]. 
The stage of defining assessment criteria may arouse a practical problem. Since the 
whole hierarchy of criteria is intended to reflect the preferences of stakeholders, their 
requests ought to be prioritized as well. The question is, how to do that? Which stake-
holders should be taken into account? How to combine their preferences? [25] Designing 
and applying a suitable strategy to generate adequate indices and their interdependen-
cies is crucial for creating a feasible criteria system. 
4.4 Element 4: Forecasting adverse effects 
Assessment of technologies is future-oriented by definition [2],[23]. The aspiration of 
(H)TA is to get a far-sighted and thorough presentation of technology and its effects. 
Some of those effects may be unintentionally harmful and undesired, but they can be 
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avoided if HTA is conducted properly.[2] Therefore, methodologies of technology fore-
casting should be included in the protocol to estimate the most probable direction of 
development of the studied technology, its effects on patients health, its influence on 
environment, as well as its economic, social, political and ethical implications 
[2],[21],[23]. Not only immediate, but also long-term influence of an implemented tech-
nology must be evaluated [23],[27]. In particular, the goal is to explore those effects, 
which may not be inherently obvious, and which may pose a threat [2]. The threats must 
be analysed thoroughly and objectively: who or what is going to be affected if the tech-
nology will be adopted and utilized, what is the most likely chain of events, what could 
be the consequences and what would be their scale, can anything be done to minimize 
the risk? [2] Also, all the assumptions made prior to the forecast should be documented. 
[2] 
There exists a variety of technology forecasting methodologies which may be incorpo-
rated into HTA protocols. Usually, in order to improve the accuracy of the estimation, a 
combination of different strategies and methods is employed. [21] 
The negative effects induced by an implemented technology are particularly important, 
because all the difficulty of health technology decision making is related to them. Safety 
of patients and improving their health instead of worsening it is the most important moti-
vation for HTA. Consequently, there cannot be an assessment without forecasting po-
tential short- and long-term hazards caused by utilization of a technology. Undeniably, 
this stage is the core of HTA processes.  
4.5 Element 5: Technology comparison 
Technologies are not suspended in a void. They interact with one another: they compete 
with rival (alternative) solutions and need complementary technologies to function 
properly [2]. Moreover, technologies become obsolete, and sometimes a technology is 
discovered to be harmful and it is withdrawn from the market. In both scenarios, the 
technology, which has become irrelevant, needs to be replaced with an alternative, either 
already existing one or one that is to be announced, to enable continuation of research, 
studies, treatment, etc. Thus, comparative assessment in a natural way is an inseparable 
stage of technology assessment. The results of assessment are not useful, as long as 
there is no reference data, which it can be compared to.[3] Rival technologies do not only 
set up a frame of reference, but they also establish a standard and define the frontiers 
of the state of art of the studied type of technology.  
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New technology is always intended to introduce some benefits and improvements in 
comparison to the older technology, regardless of its application, but this must be proven 
in a controlled, well-designed and comprehensive manner. The following questions must 
be asked: is this technology better than alternative technologies? Why is it better, how is 
it better?[1],[2],[3],[12] When used instead of existing methods, does the technology offer 
better results? Does it produce new information or improve the effectiveness of treatment 
when used in combination with existing technologies? [3]  
Marginal effectiveness (the relative superiority) of a technology may be measured with 
respect to different features such as efficiency, safety, lifetime etc. The relative weight of 
those features in the context of studied technology has to be defined a priori, so that the 
differences between indices for alternatives may be compared and the clinical signifi-
cance of those differences can be evaluated. Since technological reversals happen, and 
individual patients may need personalized treatments, undoubtedly substitutive value of 
a technology must be estimated. [3] The value tree described in the previous section can 
be utilized to clarify marginal effectiveness of rival technologies.[26] 
One more aspect which could be mentioned within the frames of comparative assess-
ment is how well the technology fits into the environment of already established technol-
ogies. Is the assessed technology compatible with commonly used complementary tech-
nologies? Does it require additional investments in custom supplements offered by the 
same company which produces the new technology? Does the use of the new technol-
ogy differ significantly from the use of rival technologies? Is it complicated? [2] This in-
formation will have an influence on the rate and extent of technology diffusion. If adopting 
and utilization of an innovation requires too much effort and is too costly, it will be rejected 
by the market and will never reach broader audiences. 
Clearly, comparing an innovation and an established technology is challenging. It often 
requires confronting estimations and hypotheses about the results of a new, unknown 
solution with well-explored (or at least what is believed to be well-explored) and empiri-
cally demonstrated effects of frequently used methods. [27] Luckily, there exist plausible 
strategies of technology forecasting, which assist the process of comparison, and with 
well-designed HTA protocol as well as systematic and consistent data recording, tech-
nology comparison may be successful. 
Surprisingly, it seems that direct comparisons of emerging and established technologies, 
which would prove supremacy of the first one over the latter one, are too rare [3]. Re-
portedly, early diffusion of technologies, which have not been adequately assessed in 
comparison to established technologies has happened [3],[4],[27]. This implies that there 
16 
 
is a possibility of investing in a new, expensive technology, that does not offer any ben-
efits in comparison to the older technology. Moreover, adopting a new technology gen-
erates also other costs, such as time spent by staff on learning the new technology and 
gaining experience on the optimal utilization of it, possible waste of samples and material 
caused by early improper use of the new technology, etc. HTA can be used to evaluate, 
whether the established technology has become obsolete and is blocking advancement 
in studies or improvement of patients’ well-being, and also, whether a new technology is 
worth the effort. 
TA and HTA provide not only absolute data about technologies, but also place them in 
the context of the whole technological universe of a given field, provide frames of refer-
ence for those technologies and by doing this also name alternative options available in 
the market. Comparing an emerging technology to existing ones is a tool of verification, 
if the technology fulfills the standards of the field, if it offers actual advantages over the 
rival technologies and it is going to revolutionize the market, or if it is faulty, potentially 
harmful, and thus inferior to other technologies. Therefore, comparative assessment is 
essential for preventing technology failure. 
4.6 Element 6: Periodical reassessment 
Technology assessment does not apply to the beginning of technology’s lifecycle curve 
only. A significant part of HTA and TA methodologies is directed toward future and fo-
cused on forecasting. Forecasting produces hypothetical and approximated data. As 
time passes and technology is being adopted and utilized, new information about it and 
its functionality becomes available. The new information may change the predictions 
about technology’s future and the most probable development paths. When this 
knowledge is combined with the fact that technology undergoes constant changes, it 
becomes obvious that assessment should be repeated on a regular basis.[2],[3],[15] Fol-
low-up studies need to be properly designed and conducted for the technologies, which 
passed the first examination and became approved by the policy makers or other au-
thorities [3]. Moreover, the technologies which have long been accepted and used as 
being standard, but there is a suspicion, that their consequences might have not been 
assessed properly, should be reassessed [4]. A new technology may be included into 
standard practices, but also a technology believed to be standard may turn out to be 
harmful or obsolete, and consequently abandoned. Moreover, technologies seen as ob-
solete for one purpose, may prove to be perfectly suitable for other applications, poten-
tially totally different than their original purpose.[1] Re-evaluation is necessary to avoid 
adverse effects of a technology, which might have not been discovered during the first 
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assessment due to incomplete information or lack of proper tools at the time it was con-
ducted. 
Figure 1 summarizes the elements of HTA proposed as critical for technology failure 
prevention. 
 
Figure 1. The elements of HTA which are fundamental for avoiding failure of a tech-
nology. 
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5. CASE STUDY 
Failed technologies are not a rare phenomenon. In this chapter an example of such tech-
nology is analysed to expose TA failure on the path of introducing the technology to the 
market and to demonstrate how a proper TA process could have prevented the failure. 
The example chosen for this purpose is metal-on-metal hip implants. 
5.1 Metal-on-metal hip implants 
Hip arthroplasty, or hip replacement, is a surgical procedure which is used to treat oste-
oarthritis and other disorders leading to painful chronic hip joint degeneration. There are 
two main types of hip prostheses: (1) total hip replacement devices (THR), which com-
prise of femoral stems and modular femoral head; (2) resurfacing devices, which replace 
the femoral head only partially. Figure 2a and Figure 2b present schematics of total hip 
replacement and hip resurfacing, respectively.  
 
Figure 2. Schematics of (a) MoM total hip replacement, (b) MoM resurfacing. 
Adapted from [28]. 
One of the materials, which has been used in production of both types of implants, is 
cobalt-chrome molybdenum alloy (CoCrMb). Prostheses where both the femoral stem 
and femoral head are made of this alloy are known as metal-on-metal (MoM) hip im-
plants. [29] 
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5.2 The source of failure and adverse tissue reaction 
MoM hip implants were introduced to the European market in 1997 [30] as durable and 
strong implants with better volumetric wear resistance (the ability to resist material loss 
in three dimensions) than other implants, and they were targeted at young patients, ac-
tive and with long life expectancy [29],[31]. Unfortunately, they turned out to fail sooner 
than implants made of other materials [29],[30]. Safety issues related to MoM implants 
received public attention when in 2010 the Australian Orthopaedic Association revealed 
a high number of revision surgeries for Articular Surface Replacement (ASR), resurfac-
ing device produced by an American company, DePuy [34]. The following chain of events 
resulted in the recall of ASR from the market all over the world. 
Mechanical wear, the source of failure of MoM implants, caused aseptic acetabular and 
femoral loosening [28],[30],[35] as well as femoral neck fracture [28],[30], so that reoper-
ations were necessary. For MoM THR implants failure rate reached up to 13.6 % at 
seven years, being four times the rate for other types of implants [29]. Although the vol-
ume of wear particles released in process of implant surface degradation was smaller 
than in case of other implants, the particles were much more numerous due to their 
smaller size and higher number of particles per unit volume [35]. Those wear particles in 
contact with tissue triggered innate and adaptive immune responses, which resulted in 
profound necrotic and inflammatory changes [31],[35]. Wear particles passing to blood-
stream resulted in elevated chromium and cobalt ion concentrations in patients’ blood, 
many times higher than physiological concentrations [34],[35]. In some patients, metal 
ions were found even in cerebral fluid [36]. Moreover, hypersensitivity and allergic reac-
tion induced by increased presence of metallic ions have been observed in many patients 
[28],[31]. Pseudotumors [31],[35] and even neurological changes have been reported as 
well [37]. Increased risk of failure was discovered to be related with female gender [34]. 
The exact number of patients around the world, who have gone through the MoM arthro-
plasties is not known, but it is certain the cases can be counted in hundreds of thousands 
[30]. Many revisions, meaning open surgeries including changing any part of the implant, 
have taken place [34]. Indications for revision are usually symptoms of tissue damage, 
elevated metal ion blood levels [29], solid pseudotumor found through cross-sectional 
imaging, infection, aseptic loosening and fracture [34]. A revised implant is seen as a 
failed implant, and asymptomatic implants are assumed to be functioning properly. Con-
sequently, there is a significant number of MoM implants remaining in situ, but their future 
is uncertain[34].It is disturbing that such a faulty technology spread so widely and was 
used in large number of patients. To understand the phenomenon and to identify the TA 
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malpractices related to MoM hip implants, which allowed the adoption of this technology 
and led to its catastrophic outcomes, the case of DePuy’s MoM hip implants has been 
analysed. 
 
5.3 Introduction of DePuy’s implants onto European market 
DePuy introduced both types of MoM implants, resurfacing and THR, to European mar-
kets in 2003 [36]. Prior to that the company conducted laboratory tests, including me-
chanical simulator tests intended to assess the materials, the strength and the wear rate 
of the implants [36]. However, the regulatory bodies in Europe did not require clinical 
trials for this class of device, and thus no such trials were conducted in relation to the 
approval process in Europe [34],[35]. Any MoM hip implant could be approved, i.e. re-
ceive CE mark, if the manufacturer was able to demonstrate similarity to a product, which 
had already been on the market, and implants such as metal-on-polyethylene (MoP) hip 
replacements were already in use for many years [38]. Figure 3 presents the elements 
of DePuy ASR TM XL total hip replacement. 
 
 
Figure 3. Elements of DePuy ASR TM XL total hip replacement: femoral head 
shown top left, acetabular cup shown top right and femoral stem shown in the 
bottom. Adapted from [39]. 
 
TA alert nr 1: no clinical trial was performed before marketing the product. It has been 
reported that simulator tests do not adequately reflect conditions imposed on the implant 
by the living tissue [36]. For surgeons, it is obvious that joint replacements must be clin-
ically tested before they are introduced to the market, so that their functionality and safety 
can be proven and so that the company can avoid investing in and selling a device, which 
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would turn out ineffective [36]. And some implants failed as soon as two years after im-
plantation, which means that clinical trials did not have to take many years to expose the 
flaws of MoM implants [28],[36]. Moreover, regulators in Europe had a flawed approach 
to definition of “similarity” of technologies. Properly assembled team of professionals 
should have determined, whether the level of “similarity” of MoM bearings to hip implants 
made of other materials was sufficient for MoM implants to be approved based on this 
principle, or insufficient, implying a need for clinical testing. Assessors should always be 
selected according to the skills needed to adequately evaluate technology and the full 
range of its properties, advantages and hazards related to it. The proper assemblance 
of assessors’ team is a manifestation of (H)TA’s context-dependency. 
5.4 Lack of transparency of European approval processes 
DePuy MoM hip prostheses received CE mark, from a so called “notified body”, a private 
organisation performing premarket approval of medical devices for EU governments, 
which in this case was a British company, BSI [35],[36]. The data about the devices 
delivered by DePuy to BSI have never been revealed to the public due to “confidentiality 
obligations” [30]. 
TA alert nr 2: The approval process was performed by a commercial entity based on their 
internal protocol and criteria, which were not known or verified by any other stakeholders. 
Such system is not transparent and constitutes a danger, enabling collusions and cor-
ruption. Activity of such institutions should be closely monitored by governmental organ-
izations and TA agencies to prevent malpractices and ensure transparency, impartiality 
and integrity of the approval procedures. 
5.5 The approval (and disapproval) for American market 
In 2008, DePuy’s THRs were approved by the FDA in the US in a similar way [29]. The 
so called “510(k) clearance process” grants approval for devices based on “similar equiv-
alence” principle: it is enough to demonstrate that the product is similar to another one 
already available on the market, and the clinical trials are not required [36],[37]. However, 
DePuy’s resurfacing method was a new technology in America, therefore it had to go 
through more scrupulous procedure, which required conducting premarket clinical trials 
for assuring implants’ safety and effectiveness [35],[36]. During the study MoM resurfac-
ings displayed a concerning rate of femoral neck fractures, even when arthroplasties 
were performed by experienced surgeons, who cooperated with DePuy in implant design 
process. This resulted in withdrawing the approval application by the company, and so 
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their resurfacing implants were never approved by the FDA [36]. Also, the failure to prove 
device’s safety and effectiveness through clinical trials in the US did not cause the com-
pany to reconsider marketing of the product in Europe. 
TA alert nr 3: If pre-marketing clinical trials had been performed for both resurfacing 
implants and THRs in the US and Europe, it is possible that MoM implants would have 
never been accepted for use in patients. At least in the US, failure rate indicated by 
clinical trials effectively prevented resurfacing implants from wider use. Even small 
changes in design can dramatically change the performance or survival of a device, es-
pecially in biological environment. Therefore, whenever a manufacturer declares “similar 
equivalence” of their new device with an already approved device, they should be re-
quired to specify every alternation the new device introduces in comparison to the older 
one. Moreover, it should be obligatory that manufacturer clarifies what impact on the 
patient the differences would have. Subsequently, a properly assembled team of inde-
pendent assessors should review manufacturer’s report and evaluate the new device to 
confirm or discredit manufacturer’s statements. Authorities and regulatory bodies should 
require, that safety of any medical device is unambiguously proven based on scientific 
and clinical evidence. Invasive medical treatments, such as hip arthroplasty, should au-
tomatically imply a need for premarket clinical verification of technology components’ 
safety, and not as separate parts, but as a whole device. Then, it should be required 
from the companies to inform all relevant regulators about any prior failed attempts to be 
granted regulatory approvals for marketing. Such precautions would help the decision 
makers to make better-educated decisions regarding the device. [29] Optionally, an open 
database collecting all filed, approved and failed applications, accessible for all inter-
ested parties could be created to ensure better exchange of information. 
5.6 Changes of implants’ dimensions and manufacturing vari-
ations 
After introducing their products to markets, DePuy started modifications of the implants 
with intention to optimise their use and range of applications. And so, the taper connec-
tions were made shorter and the neck diameter decreased to enable greater range of 
motion for the patients [30]. DePuy, inspired by the fact that for other types of implants 
larger femoral heads were proven to lower the failure rate, started introducing bigger and 
bigger heads into MoM hip implants [33]. Surprisingly, the surgeons were not informed 
about the changes; in fact, the products were still marketed with the old specifications 
[30]. However, bigger femoral heads in combination with shorter tapers caused waggling 
of the joint, resulting in increased wear and corrosion, and so they started to be noticed 
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by the surgeons [30]. The company was aware of an increased failure rate, but still over 
five years after implementing the dimension changes, company’s senior engineers were 
not able to find the reasons for the failure, and finally DePuy sought help from South-
ampton University. Nevertheless, the implants were still being implanted and the com-
pany did nothing to stop it. [30] In addition, later studies discovered that the dimensions 
of implants did not always meet the specifications. Those manufacturing variations also 
contributed to increased failure rate, especially for implants manufactured after 2006, 
which implies that changes in production processes were introduced around that time. 
[40] The FDA was successful to identify the shortening of tapers but decided this change 
did not imply safety or effectiveness issues with the device; the regulators in Europe 
failed to notice any changes in implants’ dimensions until they were notified by the sur-
geons [30]. 
TA alert nr 4: It has been already mentioned that even small modifications can influence 
a device’s functionality. Therefore, before implementing size changes in MoM implants, 
DePuy should have thoroughly studied their effects on the implants’ performance and 
survival. Also, surgeons should have been informed about the changes, so that they had 
been aware they were implanting virtually new implants. Clearly, DePuy’s internal quality 
control of the production processes failed, as it can be seen from the increasing non-
conformity in product dimensions leading to earlier failure of implants manufactured after 
2006. Acquisition of new production processes, if such took place, should have also been 
communicated to the surgeons, so that they could follow if any variations in quality or 
performance of the devices appeared after that. It is unsettling that the FDA failed to 
recognize the consequences of design changes introduced by DePuy. Even if the agency 
was not aware of the significance of such modifications for implants, it should have re-
quired that DePuy demonstrates their reasonability or at least neutrality for implants’ 
functionality. 
5.7 Safety issues of MoM hip implants 
Wear particles from MoM hip implants caused immune response, necrosis and inflam-
mation in surrounding tissue. Figure 4 shows explanted elements of DePuy’s ASR prod-
ucts and samples of fibrotic and necrotic tissue from the implantation site. Metal debris 
from the prostheses has been proven to be genotoxic and it is thought to be potentially 
carcinogenic. DePuy knew about all these hazards, however, the company never issued 
any warnings [30]. On the contrary, when the concerns about the potential carcinogen-
icity of metal ions released from MoM implants aroused, the sales representatives were 
provided with a paper written by one of the prosthesis designers, Thomas Schmalzried, 
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which was intended to oppose unfavourable evidence [30]. Moreover, the long-term con-
sequences of increased metal ion concentrations in human body are unknown to this 
day, and no toxicity thresholds have been established; consequently, there were no in-
dications for safety of MoM implants when they were introduced onto the market [30]. In 
July 2007, after debating on MoM implants safety, MHRA’s Committee on Safety of De-
vices decided that patients should be informed about the potential risks and that they 
should sign a consent for implanting those prostheses. Unfortunately, the Committee 
failed to effectively communicate this to surgeons, who were not aware of such recom-
mendation. [30] 
 
 
Figure 4. Explanted elements of DePuy’s ASR hip implants and samples of fibrotic 
and necrotic tissue from the implantation site. [41] 
 
TA alert nr 5: Virtually nothing was known about biocompatibility and long-term safety of 
MoM implants when they emerged. The technology was adopted too rapidly, without 
adequate evidence for its reasonability [38]. A similar level of uncertainty would not be 
acceptable for new medications [30]. The regulatory requirements for implants should 
not be more forgiving. It is not surprising that some call introduction of MoM implants “a 
large uncontrolled experiment” [30]. It was unethical of DePuy to induce risks of implant-
ing toxic, genotoxic and potentially carcinogenic material in patients, to hide the suspi-
cions the company had about the adverse effects of metal debris in the body, and to 
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spread misleading information. The risk taken by the company and the surgeons’ com-
munity by implanting MoM hip replacements was unnecessary, as there were other op-
tions available in the market [31],[35], and there was no scientific evidence not only for 
superiority of MoM bearings over other ones [30], but even for their reasonability [38]. 
The continuous incompetence or unwillingness of regulatory bodies to assure patients’ 
safety in this case should not be ignored. Internal periodical revisions of protocols and 
quality control must be done in such organizations, and a system of personal penalties 
for incompetent decisions need to be created to avoid corruption and assure patients 
safety. 
5.8 Biased data and intended misinformation 
As already mentioned, surgeons who cooperated with DePuy to create MoM implants, 
helped the company to provide biased, favourable or misleading evidence [35],[36]. They 
have been paid large royalties for participating in the process of implant design, consult-
ing etc. They were also on a mission of promoting MoM implants and convincing other 
surgeons to use them [36]. In 2007, DePuy was fined for paying “unlawful payments” to 
surgeons to use their products in years 2002-2006 [42]. The surgeons, who were not 
paid by the company, were often misguided by DePuy’s marketing campaign. Promotion 
material was purposefully designed in such a way, that made DePuy’s products look like 
they generated fewer metal debris than other implants [36]. 
TA alert nr 6: It is now clear that DePuy and surgeons cooperating with the company 
were driven by the desire of personal benefits, and impartiality or objectivity were ex-
cluded from the process of TA. This resulted in producing biased data about their tech-
nology, its effects and potential risks it might have brought along. In the light of reports 
of biased data produced by the commercial organizations, this might not be surprising, 
however, such practices should be diminished as they constitute a great danger for entire 
populations. Introducing impartial assessors into companies’ evaluation teams could 
help in controlling the quality of companies’ internal assessment processes. Alterna-
tively, independent, parallel TA would provide high-quality, unbiased information, which 
could be compared to the results provided by the company. More would be known about 
a given technology and decision makers would be equipped with better tools.  
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5.9 Delayed requirement for post-marketing studies 
After approving DePuy’s implants for their markets, the authorities in the US and in Eu-
rope did not demand post-marketing follow-up studies. Only in 2011, when the contro-
versies on MoM implants already aroused and spread worldwide, the FDA required man-
ufacturers to monitor the patients, in which implant failure could lead to serious conse-
quences. [30] 
TA alert nr 7: Follow-up studies should have been demanded from the manufacturers 
the moment MoM implants were introduced onto the markets, especially for those im-
plants, whose approval process did not require pre-marketing clinical studies. Those 
could have exposed the flaws and hazards of MoM implants much sooner and could 
have led to faster recall of the products. 
Clearly, many TA missteps have been taken in the process of introducing MoM implants 
onto markets, both on the side of the manufacturer and on the side of regulators and 
authorities. In 2010, DePuy voluntarily recalled one class of their implants, ASR, how-
ever, it happened after many years of denial, and new class of MoM implants, Pinnacle, 
made from the same material, was offered by the company as an “alternative”, which 
shows the company has never accepted the failure [36]. DePuy’s delayed recall and lack 
of adequate reaction regardless concerning evidence and company’s awareness of 
faulty implant design resulted in 20,000 lawsuits around the globe by July 2019 [43]. It is 
noteworthy that lawsuits regard both ASR and Pinnacle technologies [43]. In the end, 
the risks of MoM implants received the attention they should have gained from the be-
ginning, nevertheless, by that time hundreds of thousands of patients have been already 
exposed to toxic substances and have suffered from their adverse effects. 
5.10 How the disaster could have been avoided 
In the case of MoM implants, adequate HTA was not performed, which led to significant 
harm for thousands of patients. This disaster, however, could have been prevented, if 
only several HTA steps have been conducted properly. If premarketing clinical trials have 
been performed, MoM hip implants would probably have never entered the markets. 
DePuy, assisted by cooperating surgeons, produced purposefully biased data about the 
technology, and withheld unfavorable information. The manufacturer did not verify the 
impact of dimensions changes on the safety of their products prior to implementing them. 
The company did not inform regulators nor surgeons about those changes. Also, no no-
tification about a rejected approval application in the US was issued to regulators in Eu-
rope. The company did not consider it necessary to reflect on the safety of their products 
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based on the mentioned rejection. In addition, product quality control was not performed, 
or the manufacturing variations were not considered important enough for the company 
to try to eliminate them or withdraw the faulty exemplars from the market.  
If the company performed proper HTA: 
• The company would conduct clinical trials. 
• Ideally, based on the high rate of failure, the clinical trial would be stopped, 
and the product would be identified as not suitable for use in humans. Unbi-
ased reports would be published to spread the knowledge. Possibly, further 
research and attempts of improving the design would follow. The company 
would not bribe the experts cooperating with them, so that reliable, high quality 
data would be produced. The company would seek for their results to be con-
firmed by independent HTA agencies or research teams. In a perfect world, 
the motivation for both the company and the surgeons cooperating with them 
would be solely the will to help patients and to provide high quality scientific 
evidence. 
• Alternatively, if the product would pass onto the marked regardless of unfa-
vorable clinical trial results, DePuy would test any modifications before selling 
altered implants. The company would find out about the adverse effects and 
would never market modified implants. The production processes and any in-
novations of those processes as well as quality of every product would be 
controlled and monitored. This way non-conformity in product dimensions 
would be avoided and the failure rates would not rise.  
• If any dimensions modifications would turn out to improve implants’ perfor-
mance or survival, they would be communicated to regulators for approval 
prior to implementing and marketing new devices. If any approval application 
would be rejected, the company would notify other regulatory bodies, who 
might be concerned with the rejected product. 
HTA missteps happened also on the regulatory bodies end. Their approach to similarity 
of medical devices was flawed, which led to improper classification of DePuy’s MoM hip 
implants. No independent assessment of DePuy’s products nor revision of the com-
pany’s declaration took place. The approval process in Europe lacked transparency and 
reliability. Follow-up studies were required only after controversies aroused. The com-
munication between different regulators was non-existent and was ineffective between 
regulators and surgeons.  
If the proper HTA was performed by the regulators: 
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• An assembly of appropriately selected experts would be formed within both 
the FDA and European regulatory bodies to perform independent and objec-
tive HTA of MoM hip implants. These assemblies would understand that the 
principle of similarity cannot be applied to hip implants. In general, the defini-
tion of similarity would be reconsidered, and similarity requirements would be 
specified for different categories of devices. Premarketing clinical trials would 
be required for DePuy’s MoM hip implants. The assessors would review re-
ports provided by DePuy and would evaluate the devices to verify the trueness 
of data from company’s reports. Clinical trials would indicate the hazards re-
sulting from implanting MoM hip prostheses, reviews would reveal DePuy’s 
attempt to mislead the audiences, and the technology would be rejected as 
being harmful for patients. 
• Self-regulation, self-monitoring and internal quality control processes would 
take place periodically to ensure that regulatory bodies fulfil their role as ob-
jectively and accurately as possible. Repeated revision of procedures and 
methods as well as regular trainings for the assessors would be implemented. 
The assessors would not grant certifications for medical and health technolo-
gies easily and the risk of corruption would be avoided. 
• A good interorganizational communication system would be developed, so 
that the regulators could make the best educated decisions. This way the re-
jection of DePuy’s MoM resurfacing technology by the FDA would reach Eu-
ropean regulators and the approval of the device for European markets would 
be revised. Also, effective ways of information exchange between regulators, 
health care facilities and relevant groups of professionals would be developed 
to enable fast dissemination of important alerts, warnings and recommenda-
tions. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Researchers agree that society, businesses and health care rely increasingly on tech-
nology and that the rate of technological innovations is greater than ever before. How-
ever, technology is only as good as the research and knowledge standing behind it. 
Since it is created by humans, who obviously have limited capabilities, technology fails 
sometimes. As technology plays such an important role in today’s world, technology fail-
ure can be very costly; especially health technology malfunctioning may have disastrous 
consequences. It may cause injuries, enduring health problems, or even deaths. From 
the point of view of health care providers and research facilities, health technology re-
versals may cause huge economic losses, waste of resources, legal issues, and what is 
probably most undesirable, loss of credibility and public trust. Therefore, it is necessary 
that there exists a means to reduce technology failures to minimum. This thesis demon-
strates that carefully designed, structured, standardized and well conducted TA allows 
safe and proper use of technologies and as such can be a powerful tool in preventing 
technology failure. Based on literature review, a subjective collection of the most signifi-
cant ingredients and steps of TA in the context of failure prevention was proposed. Those 
elements are: (1) Impartiality and objectivity; (2) Planning; (3) Defining criteria of evalu-
ation; (4) Forecasting adverse effects; (5) Technology comparison; (6) Periodical reas-
sessment. A TA process containing all these elements is the best strategy to prevent a 
technology failure and its potential tragic consequences. Those TA ingredients were 
found by the author to be critical for producing reliable, understandable, standardized 
and applicable information about technologies. Only such information could assist deci-
sion makers on different levels and in various parties of the health technology industry 
and medical care delivery to create effective and safe system of health care. Such infor-
mation could also boost research and innovations by providing high quality data, which 
would be comparable and further processable. 
The last chapter of this thesis used real life example of technology failure to demonstrate 
how misconducted technology assessment led to wide adoption of metal-on-metal im-
plants, which had catastrophic results. Suggestions on what could have been done to 
prevent this large-scale failure were presented. The cardinal mistake was lack of pre-
marketing clinical trial, which was not required by regulatory instances for approving the 
implants to the markets. The principle of technological similarity was misinterpreted by 
regulators in this case. This led to lack of scrutiny in the assessment of MoM hip implants. 
The missteps taken by the company were unreliable, biased data provided for surgeons, 
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not revised by independent HTA agencies nor regulatory bodies; intended disinfor-
mation; hiding unfavourable evidence; and introducing untested modifications without 
communicating them to the consumers or regulators. DePuy’s case is also an example 
of scientific evidence replaced by corruption. It should be treated as a warning by health 
technology assessors, showing that lack of objectivity, impartiality and scepticism in HTA 
results not only in false information and discredit of science, but also in disastrous con-
sequences for entire populations. 
Interestingly, it is not easy to find scientific articles pondering particular cases of technol-
ogy failure (with the exceptions of glucometers and MoM implants). As technology failure 
cases indicate how poorly conducted TA can lead to casualties and delays in achieving 
successful research results, they should be studied more frequently and more inten-
sively, especially by TA specialists. Also, analysing technology reversal incidents ought 
to be a field of interest for biomedical engineering as a tool of tracing the ways of tech-
nological development and mistakes made on the way. Exploring reversals could sensi-
tize engineers to a broader range of problems, which should be addressed when a new 
technology is developed. Engineers could avoid making mistakes by learning on those 
made earlier by their peers. Such studies would provide an insight into real history of a 
technology, indicating the patterns and directions of innovative thinking as well as its 
outcomes. All of these would result in improvements in the whole research and develop-
ment area. 
Since (H)TA is strongly context-dependent, one universal strategy of (H)TA cannot be 
created. Nevertheless, some universal rules would significantly improve the quality and 
compatibility of information produced through (H)TAs. Uniform reporting system and a 
common database of performed (H)TAs should exist to facilitate future execution, learn-
ing and design processes, and to serve as a reliable source of information for all groups 
of interests. Authorities could publish recommendations and lists of available alternative 
methodologies for evaluating certain categories of devices to enhance uniformity and 
comparability of (H)TAs performed for products being within one such group. A system 
of peer reviews could be created so that possible mistakes or gaps of executed (H)TAs 
could be pointed out. The events organized by existing organizations focused on (H)TA 
could be better promoted, so that more professionals and students, for whom this topic 
is important, could participate in those events and follow their outcomes. As some au-
thors report lack of qualified professionals or insufficient training provided for those al-
ready involved in (H)TA processes [5],[7],[8], more attention should be paid to the pro-
cess of recruiting, educating and training future and present (H)TA professionals. Stu-
dents of sciences related to health technology ought to get acquainted with the discipline 
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and its importance already in the early phase of their studies. Those who would find the 
field of (H)TA interesting, would get a chance to specialize in it and use any opportunity 
to increase their knowledge and practical skills. Especially BME students and profes-
sionals should be increasingly included in the discipline of (H)TA. 
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